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ARGUMENT
I. THERE IS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY TO SUPPORT THE APPLICATION OF THE
SELF-CARE PROVISION OF THE FAMILY MEDICAL LEAVE ACT TO THE
STATES.
The State of Utah argues that there is no legislative history sufficient in the debates
regarding the self-care provision Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C.S. § 2611 et seq.
to presume that it confronts issues of gender discrimination or to support the decision by
Congress to extend the Act to the States.1 Under the State's theory of the Act, the State
has no immunity when Ms. Nicholas acts as a care-giver because that role is historically
female. When she suffers illness as a result as a consequence of her care-giving, she is nol
protected. The Congressional history of the FMLA does not support this conclusion.
In support of its assertions regarding the lack of record tying the Act to issues of
gender discrimination, the state cites a summary2 of the testimony relating to the act as
evidence that the self-care provision was directed at protecting the sick, not preventing
discrimination among them. In noting that the legislative history makes no reference to

!

In Appellant's Opening Brief, Nicholas cited Toeller v. Wisconsin Dept. OfCorr., 296 F.
Supp. 2d 946 (E.D. Wis. 2003) for the proposition that the self-care provision of the FMLA was
a proper exercise of Congressional authority. That decision has now been reversed by the 7th
Circuit Court of Appeals in Toeller v. Wisconsin Dept. OfCorr., 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 21690
(7th Cir. 2006/
2

The summary attached to the Appellee's brief as Exhibit D does not constitute the
legislative history of the Family Medical Leave Act as represented by the State ("The
history includes on anecdote...." Appellee's Brief, page 18). The legislative history
includes hundreds of pages of written testimony, hearings and debate by both houses of
Congress.
1

either the States or issues of gender, the State points to a passage in the history
referencing testimony by a woman with colon cancer. At the same time, however, the
State ignores other sections of the text. Under "Leave for the Employee's Own Serious
Illness," the report states:
Indeed, it is hard to understand how single parents, who have no choice but
to work to support their families, have survived under the present system.
For this highly vulnerable group, whose numbers have exploded, a job
guarantee for periods when they or their children have serious health
conditions is urgently necessary. The high rates of single parenthood
among minority families and of labor force participation by minority
single mothers make job-guaranteed leaves especially critical for
minorities.
S. Rep. No. 103-3 (1993), emphasis added, attached to Appellee's Brief as Exhibit D. Not
only does this language indicate a specific intention to protect women and minorities,
both protected classes, it demonstrates the relationship between the family leave provision
and the personal leave provision and supports the notion that the statute must be read as a
whole, not broken into individual pieces.
By focusing on that one report, the State neglects other record evidence, including
the language of the act itself, that Congress saw evidence of discrimination against
women in the dissemination of medical leave. "The bill will provide no incentive to
discriminate against women, because it addresses the leave needs of workers who are
young and old, male and female, married and single." H.R. Rep. No. 28, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993). "This legislation is as much about giving women an equal economic

2

opportunity as it is about providing a national policy to protect jobs during times of family
crisis." 139 Cong. Rec. 2262 (1993).
Moreover, the Congressional Record contains a long history of evidence of gender
discrimination by the States toward women in conditions of employment. That the history
exists in the record outside the debates regarding the Family Medical Leave is not
dispositive. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (noting that an
examination of the legislative record is not necessary in all circumstances.) "After
Congress has legislated repeatedly in an area of national concern, its Members gain
experience that may reduce the need for fresh hearings or prolonged debate when
Congress again considers action in that area." Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 503
(1980) (Powell, J., concurring). See also; Hibbs v. Dept. of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844,
861 (9th Cir. 2001) ("when our nation's judicial history already documents
unconstitutional discrimination against the class at issue, there is no need for Congress,
separately and redundantly, to provide detailed findings of such discrimination in order to
exercise its Fourteenth Amendment powers.").
There is no question that the States have been complicit in the nation's long history
of gender discrimination. As recently as 1973, the United States Supreme Court noted the
impact of the culture's paternalistic attitude toward women. "As a result of notions such
as these, our statute books gradually became laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions
between the sexes . . . . Neither slaves nor women could hold office, serve on juries, or
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bring suit in their own names, and married women traditionally were denied the legal
capacity to hold or convey property or to serve as legal guardians of their own children."
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973). The Court went on to note that while
the position of women had improved, there continued to be substantial, although at times
more subtle, discrimination in arenas controlled by the states. Id.
Moreover, Congress had a long record of legislative history relating to
discrimination, including discrimination by the states, with regard to women's rights as
employees including hearings arising out of the passage of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C.
206(d)(1), Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. et. seq and the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k). In each of these cases, Congress found sufficient
evidence to extend the reach of the law to the States. By the time Congress passed the
pregnancy discrimination act in 1978, the Supreme Court had twice considered whether a
failure to provide medical coverage for pregnancy constituted discrimination and in both
case found that it did not. See; Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) and General
Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). Each of these decisions resulting in continued
debate before Congress regarding discrimination against women in the workplace.
Even after passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, there was debate over
whether the act protected the pregnant spouses of male employees. Newport News
Shipbuilding and Dry Dock v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983) ("It seems to me that analysis
of this case should end here. Under our [previous decisions], petitioner's exclusion of
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pregnancy benefits for male employees' spouses would not offend Title VII. Nothing in
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act was intended to reach beyond female employees.") Id,
at 693, (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Because the problem was not fully solved by the
Act, Congress addressed the issue again in the Family Medical Leave Act, which in
addition to the self-care provision which provides leave for women who become ill as a
result of and after childbirth, also includes a provision for leave necessitated by the birth
or adoption of a child.
The case law dismissing claims by State employees based on 11th Amendment
Immunity almost uniformly arises out of a decision to look at the Act in individual pieces.
The result is the old adage of missing the forest for the trees. The language of the statute
and the legislative history demonstrate an intention by Congress to move toward the goal
of protecting both job and family stability, without sacrificing one for the other. The facts
of this case support the notion that the Act only functions as intended when read together,
as a whole.
Lynn Nicholas took leave to help care for her son and grandchild after her
daughter-in-law died during childbirth. This leave was not covered by the Act because the
son was not a dependent. As time progressed, Ms. Nicholas took sporadic leave, both to
help her son and to deal with her own depression. Finally, when her difficulty in dealing
with sadness became overwhelming, she took personal medical leave. When the act is
not read as a whole, the job security of an employee with a serious illness is nonexistent,
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leaving the family without access to short term relief to protect itself from one of the most
significant negative impacts resulting from the illness of one of its members. By
providing leave, to be administered in a nondiscriminatory manner, the Act completes its
intention of protecting the family and the workplace.
Thus, the Family Medical Leave act in all of its provisions serves to fill the holes
left by other measures intended to insure that sick leave is administered equitably. That
purpose is consistent with Congressional power authorized by the 14th amendment and is
not prohibited by 11th Amendment immunity.3
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing the Court should find that Congress was acting within its
authority and that State of Utah cannot avoid complying with its promises pursuant to the
FMLA by relying on its sovereign immunity.

3

. The Utah Public Employees Association submitted an Amicus Curiae Brief to educate
the Court that in some circuits employees retain the right to sue their individual supervisors or to
request injunctive relief. The Brief does not address any of the issues raised in this case.
Moreover, the brief does not acknowledge that the issue regarding the right to sue individual
supervisors is the subject of a split among the circuits. Compare; Darby v. Bratch, 87 F. 3d 673
(8th Cir. 2002) with Mitchell v. Chapman, 343 F.3d 811, 832 (6th Cir. 2003). Thus, there is not
necessarily an alternate litigation strategy available to Nicholas.
6

Nicholas asks the Court to reverse the decision of the Court below and remand this
matter for further proceedings.
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7

^

day of November 2006.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 'IP day of November 2006, I caused two true and
exact copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT LYNN NICHOLAS to
be placed in the United States Mail, addressed to:

Reha Deal, Esq.
Assistant Utah Attorney General
Utah Attorney General
Litigation Unit
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140856
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856

Benson L. Hathaway, Jr.
Stephen W. Geary
Kirton & McConkie
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120

8

